Science and Engineering
Securing LNG Infrastructure in West Africa: Strategic Lessons for Global Energy and U.S. Security Policy
A recent study on the security of liquefied natural gas (LNG) terminals in West Africa underscores the growing vulnerabilities of critical maritime infrastructure in high-risk environments and highlights the strategic consequences for global energy markets, including those of the United States. The research, titled “Marine Security Risk Management in High-Risk Zones: Lessons from West African LNG Terminals” by Ayomipo Ewuola of Nigeria LNG Ltd., published recently offers a data-rich examination of the threat landscape surrounding LNG operations in the Gulf of Guinea—one of the world’s most volatile maritime zones.
The Gulf of Guinea continues to be a focal point for maritime insecurity, characterized by piracy, armed robbery, smuggling, and evolving terrorist threats. Ewuola’s study provides a comprehensive analysis of how these risks directly threaten LNG supply chains, detailing how the fixed and predictable nature of LNG terminals makes them particularly attractive to non-state actors. The 2021 hijacking of an LNG support vessel near Bonny Island, Nigeria, and the 2018 threat of sabotage at Ghana’s Tema terminal serve as prominent case studies within the report, illustrating both the vulnerabilities and the reactive capacities of existing security frameworks.
The report advocates for a multi-tiered marine security risk management model that combines advanced maritime domain awareness (MDA) technologies—such as radar systems, AIS tracking, and satellite surveillance—with perimeter hardening, coordinated patrols, cyber defense systems, and rapid response mechanisms. Crucially, the study emphasizes the need for adaptive strategies that reflect both technological evolution and the local political economy. These include the integration of local communities into the broader security architecture and the use of intelligence-sharing mechanisms that transcend institutional and national silos.
The implications for the United States are significant. As a leading global producer, exporter, and increasingly a consumer of LNG, the U.S. has vested interests in the stability of supply routes and the integrity of production hubs—many of which are concentrated in high-risk regions like West Africa. The Gulf of Guinea’s strategic position along Atlantic LNG shipping lanes means that any disruption in this corridor could have outsized ripple effects on international LNG pricing, delivery timelines, and market confidence. In particular, delays or attacks affecting vessels chartered by U.S.-based energy firms would have immediate operational and financial consequences.
Moreover, many American companies maintain joint ventures, shipping contracts, or service agreements tied to West African LNG operations. These firms face mounting operational risks, from rising insurance premiums to regulatory scrutiny and reputational exposure. According to the International Maritime Bureau, the Gulf of Guinea has accounted for the majority of global crew kidnappings at sea in the last decade, highlighting the acute nature of the regional threat environment. Ewuola’s research suggests that while isolated technological improvements can reduce tactical risks, broader structural challenges—such as jurisdictional fragmentation and under-resourced maritime enforcement—must be addressed to ensure long-term stability.
The study’s recommendations resonate with several ongoing U.S. foreign and security policy priorities. For example, the U.S. Africa Command (AFRICOM) and Naval Forces Africa (NAVAF) have supported capacity-building and joint training programs aimed at improving maritime domain awareness and regional patrol capabilities. Ewuola’s call for harmonized regulatory frameworks and enhanced inter-agency coordination aligns with these initiatives. At the same time, the findings offer actionable insights for American policymakers, including opportunities to strengthen public-private cooperation and expand U.S. support for regional security platforms such as the Yaoundé Architecture.
The report also sheds light on a growing area of concern for U.S. energy security experts: the convergence of cyber and physical threats targeting offshore infrastructure. As LNG terminals increasingly adopt digital control systems, they become susceptible to cyberattacks capable of disabling safety protocols, disrupting navigation, or facilitating physical intrusions. Ewuola warns that GPS spoofing, cyber-physical sabotage, and coordinated multi-vector attacks are not speculative risks—they are emerging realities requiring urgent attention. These findings are consistent with assessments by the U.S. Department of Homeland Security and Department of Energy, both of which have cited overseas LNG facilities as points of vulnerability within global supply chains.
Beyond the operational and technical recommendations, the research underscores the importance of local stakeholder engagement. Ewuola argues that community-based intelligence gathering, employment initiatives, and conflict prevention mechanisms can significantly reduce insider threats and contribute to early detection of criminal or militant activity. In some cases, communities have played a critical role in preventing sabotage or enabling rapid response to unfolding incidents. This dimension of the study complements current U.S. approaches to counterterrorism and development assistance, which increasingly recognize the role of non-state actors and local populations in shaping security outcomes.
Importantly, the research does not view LNG terminal security as an isolated national issue but rather as a shared international responsibility. LNG is a global commodity, and the infrastructure supporting it—whether in West Africa, Southeast Asia, or the Middle East—serves markets across continents. Supply chain fragility in one region can reverberate worldwide. The United States, along with its partners and allies, has a strategic interest in supporting the resilience of such infrastructure, particularly in regions where governance challenges are acute and state capacity is limited.
Ewuola’s contribution is thus both timely and globally relevant. It provides a structured, evidence-based framework for understanding marine security risk management in LNG operations, supported by real-world examples and policy-relevant recommendations. The study invites a broader dialogue on how countries like the United States can engage not only as energy consumers or investors, but as strategic partners in advancing maritime governance, technology transfer, and resilience planning.
In conclusion, the security of LNG terminals in West Africa is no longer a regionally contained issue. It is a global concern with material implications for energy security, economic stability, and geopolitical alignment. As LNG continues to play a growing role in energy transitions and international diplomacy, the need for secure, stable, and resilient infrastructure becomes increasingly urgent. Ewuola’s research provides the analytical groundwork for moving from reactive risk mitigation to proactive strategic planning—an agenda that both the public and private sectors in the United States would be wise to embrace.